Performance Contracting in After-Sales Service Supply Chains by Kim, Sang-Hyun et al.
University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons
Operations, Information and Decisions Papers Wharton Faculty Research
12-2007
Performance Contracting in After-Sales Service
Supply Chains
Sang-Hyun Kim
University of Pennsylvania
Morris A. Cohen
Serguei Netessine
University of Pennsylvania
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.upenn.edu/oid_papers
Part of the Operations and Supply Chain Management Commons
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. http://repository.upenn.edu/oid_papers/171
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kim, S., Cohen, M. A., & Netessine, S. (2007). Performance Contracting in After-Sales Service Supply Chains. Management Sciecne, 53
(12), 1843-1858. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1070.0741
Performance Contracting in After-Sales Service Supply Chains
Abstract
Performance-based contracting is reshaping service support supply chains in capital-intensive industries such
as aerospace and defense. Known as “power by the hour” in the private sector and as “performance-based
logistics” (PBL) in defense contracting, it aims to replace traditionally used fixed-price and cost-plus contracts
to improve product availability and reduce the cost of ownership by tying a supplier's compensation to the
output value of the product generated by the customer (buyer).
To analyze implications of performance-based relationships, we introduce a multitask principal-agent model
to support resource allocation and use it to analyze commonly observed contracts. In our model the customer
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offers contracts contingent on availability to n suppliers (agents) of the key subsystems used in the product,
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find that the second-best contract combines a fixed payment, a cost-sharing incentive, and a performance
incentive. Furthermore, we study how these contracts evolve over the product deployment life cycle as
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Abstract
Performance-based contracting is reshaping service support supply chains in capital intensive in-
dustries such as aerospace and defense. Known as “power by the hour” in the private sector and
as performance-based logistics (PBL) in defense contracting, it aims to replace traditionally used
fixed-price and cost-plus contracts in order to improve product availability and reduce the cost of
ownership by tying a supplier’s compensation to the output value of the product generated by the
customer (buyer).
To analyze implications of performance-based relationships, we introduce a multitask principal-
agent model to support resource allocation and use it to analyze commonly observed contracts. In
our model the prime (principal) faces a product availability requirement dictated by its customer
for the “uptime” of the end product. The prime then offers contracts contingent on availability to
n suppliers (agents) of the key subsystems used in the product, who in turn exert cost reduction
efforts and set spare parts inventory investment levels. We show that the first-best solution can
be achieved if channel members are risk-neutral. When channel members are risk-averse, we find
that the second-best contract combines a fixed payment, a cost-sharing incentive and a performance
incentive. Furthermore, we show how these contracts evolve over the product deployment life cycle
as product use and support cost risks change. We show, in particular, that when the prime is
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model to a problem based on aircraft maintenance data and show how the allocation of performance
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1 Introduction
Support and maintenance services continue to constitute a significant part of the U.S. economy, often
generating twice as much profit as do sales of original products. For example, a study by Accenture (see
[1]) found that $9B in after-sales revenues produced $2B in profits for General Motors, which is a much
higher rate of profit than its $150B in car sales generated over the same time period. According to
the same study, after-sales services and parts contribute only 25% of revenues across all manufacturing
companies but are often responsible for 40-50% of profits.
Since maintenance services are often provided and consumed by two different organizations (i.e., the
OEM and the customer), the issue of contracting between them becomes important. While contracts
for maintenance services of simpler products (electronics, automobiles) often involve fixed payments for
warranties, there are many instances of complex systems that require more sophisticated relationships
between service buyers and suppliers. For example, in capital-intensive industries such as aerospace
and defense, it is very hard to guarantee product availability due to significant uncertainties in product
reliability and usage as well as inherent product complexity, resulting in large risks to both the customer
and service provider. Therefore maintenance support in these industries is typically conducted using
fixed-price or cost-plus contracts: under the former, the buyer of support services pays a fixed fee to
the supplier to purchase necessary parts and support services, whereas under the latter the supplier
repairs the product and charges full cost plus a premium to the buyer. Studies in the defense industry
(see http://www.pblprograms.com) estimate that 80% of current maintenance contracts are cost-plus,
and the remaining 20% are fixed-price.
Through our work with major defense contractors we observe a major shift in the world of support
and maintenance logistics for complex systems over the past few years. Performance-based contracting,
a novel approach for the sustainment business, is replacing traditional service procurement practices.
This approach is often referred to as “power by the hour” or performance-based logistics (PBL) in,
respectively, the airline and defense industries. The idea behind it is quite simple: one buys the results
of product use (e.g., value creation), not the service parts or repair services required to restore or
maintain a product. The premise behind performance-based contracting is elaborated in the official
Department of Defense (DoD) guidelines1:
The essence of Performance Based Logistics is buying performance outcomes, not the indi-
vidual parts and repair actions... Instead of buying set levels of spares, repairs, tools, and
data, the new focus is on buying a predetermined level of availability to meet the [buyer’s]
1Excerpt from Defense Acquisition Guidebook Section 5.3 (http://akss.dau.mil/dag).
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objectives.
Performance-based contracts originally were implemented in commercial settings predominantly for
avionics products. For example, engine manufacturers General Electric, Pratt & Whitney, and Rolls
Royce all have performance-based contracts with commercial airlines in which their compensation is
tied to product availability (hours flown). Recently, the U.S. Department of Defense has initiated the
implementation of pilot PBL programs in the military; in 2005 there were 92 such programs, compared
with 57 programs in 2002 (see http://www.pblprograms.com). Among frequently cited PBL success
stories are avionics for the H-60 helicopter contract that brought logistic response time (LRT) down
from 52.7 days pre-PBL to 8 days after PBL implementation and the F/A-18 Hornet aircraft contract
with a pre-PBL LRT of 42.6 days and a post-PBL LRT of 2 days, among many others. Inspired
by such notable success of PBL contracts, on August 16, 2004, the DoD issued Memorandum 5000.1,
which “requires program managers to develop and implement PBL strategies that optimize total system
availability,” thus mandating all future maintenance contracts to be based on performance.
A critical element of performance-based contracting is the clear separation between the buyer’s
expectations of service (the performance goal) and the supplier’s implementation (how it is achieved):
in other words, “The contract explicitly identifies what is required, but the contractor determines how
to fulfill the requirement” (Macfarlan and Mansir [16]). As a consequence, PBL contracting should
promote new and improved ways to manage spare parts inventory, negotiate contracts, and make
resource allocation decisions. For example, under the traditional cost-plus contract, the supplier of a
service must truthfully report its detailed cost structure to the buyer in order to estimate which exact
expenses are eligible for reimbursement. Under a PBL arrangement, the supplier does not have to
support cost sharing at this level of detail. Moreover, the product buyer no longer directly manages or
possibly even owns resources such as the inventory of spares and thus is not concerned with specifics
such as inventory stocking, as long as the availability target is met. Finally, in the long run suppliers
may find it in their interest to invest in designing and producing more reliable products (i.e., with lower
part failure rates) and/or more efficient repair and logistics capabilities.
Not surprisingly, such a radical change in the approach to contracting with the DoD has caused
controversy among suppliers of maintenance services. For example, among 128 suppliers whose bids
were solicited on a PBL support contract, only 5 responded positively, and the rest simply responded
“not interested” (see http://www.pblprograms.com). As chief logistician of Northrop Gruman (one of
the major DoD contractors) put it, “after nearly five years since its inception, PBL still is generating
a great deal of discussion and will engender a major cultural and responsibility change at the supplier
level” (see Phillips [19]). Moreover, the purported benefits of PBL arrangements came under the
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scrutiny of the Government Accountability Office, which recently concluded that “DoD program offices
could not demonstrate that they have achieved cost savings or performance improvements through the
use of performance based logistics arrangements.”2
The preceding discussion underscores the urgency and lack of understanding of PBL arrangements.
The academic literature, however, offers little guidance with respect to how such contracts should be
executed. In this paper we aim to take a first step towards filling this void by proposing a model
of contractual relationships that arise in practice when procuring repair and maintenance services
in a performance-based environment. We embed a standard single-location spare parts inventory
management problem into a moral hazard model with one principal (representing the prime supplier
of the product or the end customer), and multiple interdependent agents (representing suppliers of the
key product subsystems), in which each agent (supplier) performs two tasks: inventory management
of spares and cost reduction activities. We use this model to analyze three types of contracts (and
any combination thereof) that are commonly encountered in aerospace and defense procurement and
high technology industries: fixed-price, cost-plus and PBL. In analyzing these contracts we pursue the
following goals: (1) what is the optimal combination of contractual levers that achieves the best possible
outcome for the buyer? (2) how should performance requirements for the final product be allocated
to suppliers? and (3) how should the risk associated with the maintenance of complex equipment be
shared among channel members?
We show that, in the absence of incentive problems (i.e., if suppliers’ decisions are observable and
contractible), the contract that achieves the first-best solution is a nonperformance arrangement that
combines partial cost reimbursement with a fixed payment. If supplier actions are unobservable and the
parties are risk-neutral, we show that the first-best solution can still be achieved using a contract that
combines a performance incentive with a fixed payment (but no cost sharing). However, when even
one of the parties is risk-averse, the first-best solution cannot be achieved. We show that in this case
“pure” fixed-price, cost-plus or performance-based contracts (or any pair-wise combinations of them)
are not suitable because they do not provide the necessary incentives. Thus, we show that the second-
best contract involves all three elements: a combination of a fixed payment, a cost sharing payment
and a performance-based payment. For any such contract we show that each supplier’s problem is
well-behaved (quasi-concave) under suitable parameter restrictions and we find analytically optimal
decisions for all suppliers for any given contract proposed by the buyer. Unfortunately, the buyer’s
problem neither is well-behaved nor admits to tractable analytical solutions (the latter is true even in
the centralized supply chain). Using a combination of analytical results for special cases and numerical
2See http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-966.
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analysis performed on a data set that is representative of a supply chain supporting a fleet of military
airplanes, we obtain insights into the structure of the optimal contract. In particular, we study the
sensitivity of the optimal contract to an operating characteristic (i.e., cost uncertainty) and infer that,
when the principal is less (more) risk-averse than the suppliers, the performance incentive increases
(decreases), whereas the cost sharing incentive decreases (increases) as time progresses. Finally, we
analyze the impact of problem parameters on contractual terms, performance, and profitability.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper represents the first attempt to embed the after-sales
service supply chain model into the principal-agent framework in which channel members behave in a
self-interested manner. Our results are consistent with the observed practice of using multiple contract
types whose mix evolves over time. Finally the model framework introduced here can be implemented
in conjunction with more detailed supply chain models to support contract negotiations and long-term
strategy analysis. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. After a brief review of related literature
in Section 2, we present modeling assumptions and notations in Section 3, followed by the formulation
of the principal-agent model. In the same section we analyze the first-best solution as well as derive
solutions for the general second-best case. In Section 4 we analyze special cases, beginning with the
risk-neutrality assumption, then an assumption of partial observability of suppliers’ actions, and finally
a situation with one supplier. The section concludes with a numerical analysis of the practical set of
data. Finally, in Section 5 we discuss managerial implications of our study.
2 Literature Review
Two distinct models blend together in our paper: a classic inventory allocation model for repairable
items, well known in operations management, and the moral hazard model that has been an area of
active research in economics. The theory of repairable parts inventory management dates back to
the 1960s when Feeney and Sherbrooke [11] introduced a stochastic model of the repairable inventory
problem whose steady-state solution relies on the application of Palm’s Theorem. Sherbrooke’s MET-
RIC model (Sherbrooke [23]) introduced a heuristic optimization algorithm for allocating inventory
resources for the multi-echelon, multi-indentured version of the problem. Subsequent models have led
to notable success in enabling the management of multimillion-dollar service parts inventory resources
in both commercial and government applications (e.g., see Cohen et al. [8] for a discussion of a suc-
cessful application of multi-echelon optimization by IBM’s service support division). Research in this
area has largely focused on improving computational efficiency and incorporating more realistic as-
sumptions, such as allowing for capacitated supply or nonstationary demand processes. For a recent
comprehensive account of developments in this field, see Muckstadt [18], who reviews the underlying
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theory, Sherbrooke [24], which focuses on aerospace and defense industry applications, and Cohen et
al. [7], which introduces a modeling framework that has been used to guide the development of state-
of-the art software solutions in various industries. In brief, repairable inventory models are typically
concerned with finding the optimal (cost-minimizing) inventory stocking targets for each product com-
ponent subject to an overall service constraint. Service (performance) requirements can be defined in
terms of either item fill rates or end product availability (i.e., system “uptime”). The latter is preferred
in our context of performance contracting because there is a one-to-one mapping between inventory
investment and item backorders: the latter drive overall product delay, which in turn drives product
uptime.
It is important to note that while the one-location variant of the availability problem is well behaved
(i.e., convex), extensions that include multiple echelons/locations, material classes/indentures and al-
ternative sourcing options (new buy, repair, internal transfer) lead to large-scale nonlinear, non-convex,
stochastic optimization problems with millions of decision variables and thousands of constraints. Cur-
rent state-of-the-art solutions are based on variants of the greedy heuristic introduced by Sherbrooke.
Numerous papers study the principal-agent models, and comprehensive reviews can be found in
Bolton and Dewatripont [3]. The building block for our paper is the moral hazard model in which
actions of agents (suppliers) are unobservable to the principal (buyer). Moreover, our model includes el-
ements of multitasking (Holmström and Milgrom [13]), because two decision variables for suppliers, the
cost reduction effort and the inventory position, interact with each other. An additional complication
is the presence of multiple agents whose contracts are interdependent due to the performance constraint
that the principal faces. The mainstream interest in the principal-agent theory is in designing opti-
mal nonlinear contracts. Despite the theoretical appeal, the predominant form of contracts observed
in practice is linear. Holmström and Milgrom [12] addressed this discrepancy by explaining that a
sequence of repeated observations of performance outcomes necessitates a simple linear relationship
between the aggregate performance and the aggregate payment, effectively collapsing the multi-period
dynamic contracting problem into a single-period problem. In this paper we take a descriptive ap-
proach and assume that the linear contract form is exogenously specified, which is consistent with our
observations of industrial practices in the defense and other industries. The economics literature that
studies contracting for defense procurement takes the same approach when analyzing incentives. For
example, Scherer [22] discusses linear (cost-plus and fixed-price) contracts as well as the impact of
risk aversion in defense contracting. Similar to Scherer’s work, we allow for risk aversion and study
cost-plus and fixed-price contracts in the context of maintenance and compare them with performance
contracts. Cummins [10] studies risk sharing and the role of risk aversion in defense contracts.
Incentive alignment in supply chains through contracts has been a topic of great interest in oper-
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ations management over the past decade (see Cachon [4] for a comprehensive survey). Recently, the
role of information asymmetry has received considerable attention both in the adverse selection setting
(representative articles include Corbett [9], Iyer et al. [14], Lutze and Ozer [15] and Su and Zenios [25])
and in the moral hazard setting (for example, see Plambeck and Zenios [21], Chen [5] and Plambeck
and Taylor [20]). The current paper addresses the growing interest in this area.
As is evident from our survey, although there is voluminous literature on service supply chain
parts-inventory management, to date this stream of research has been confined to single-firm models
and hence does not address issues that arise in decentralized supply chains in practice. Furthermore,
although extensive literature in economics aims to model contractual relationships among different
parties, it does not address the complexities of repair and maintenance contracting environments. To
our knowledge, our paper is the first to put a repairable parts model into the decentralized framework
and to study the issue of contracting in after-sales service supply chains.
3 Model
3.1 Modeling Assumptions
The principal, henceforth called the prime, is the prime supplier of N assembled products (“systems,”
which can be airplanes, computers, manufacturing equipment, etc.) to customers such as airlines,
branches of the military or industrial companies. Each system is composed of n distinct major parts
(“subsystems” which, in the case of an airplane, can represent avionics, landing gear, weapons systems,
etc.), each produced and maintained by a unique supplier. We use subscript 0 to denote the prime
and subscript i for subsystem supplier i, i = 1, 2, ..., n. Failure of subsystem i occurs at a Poisson rate
λi. Each supplier maintains an inventory of spares and a repair facility. A failed unit is immediately
replaced by an operating unit (if it is available) from the supplier’s inventory with transportation lead
times assumed to be negligible. If a replacement is unavailable, a backorder occurs, and the system
becomes inoperable. As a result, downtime in any subsystem leads to downtime of the entire system.
Upon failure, the defective unit immediately goes into the repair facility, modeled as an M/G/∞ queue
(i.e., we assume ample repair capacity). It takes on average Li time units to repair and ship the
subsystem, and once the task is completed the subsystem is placed in the supplier’s inventory, i.e., we
assume one-for-one replenishment to a target stock level. Therefore, we have a closed-loop cycle for the
repair process. As the subsystems are typically very expensive and their lifetimes are very long, we
assume that no subsystem is discarded during the entire support period. We also ignore the breakdown
of subsystems into multiple components which typically include line replaceable units (LRUs) as well
as lower indenture level components, i.e., each subsystem is treated as a single composite item. Figure
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Figure 1: Closed loop cycle for repairable items.
1 illustrates this process. One of supplier i’s decisions is the target stocking level for subsystem
spare parts inventory si which determines the fill rate as well as the expected number of backorders.
Evidently, there is a total of N + si units of subsystem i in the supply chain, but only si of them are
owned by the supplier.3
The number of backorders, Bi, is a random variable that is observed continuously. Bi and si are
related to each other through Bi = (Oi − si)+, where Oi is a stationary random variable representing
the pipeline (on-order) inventory. Palm’s Theorem states that Oi is Poisson-distributed, with the mean
μi = λiLi (see Feeney and Sherbrooke [11]). Although this observation leads to closed-form expressions
for system performance metrics, it turns out that working with integer-valued random and decision
variables complicates our analysis significantly, as additional complexity results from the game-theoretic
situation considerations associated with the various contracting options. In particular, conducting
comparative statics to gain insights into firms’ behavior is prohibitively complex. For this reason,
we depart from the usual discrete Poisson process assumption and model Oi, Bi, and si as continuous
variables. This approach is reasonable in our context since each unit of a supplier’s inventory represents
a composite of the various LRUs and the components associated with their particular subsystem.
To this end, we let Oi be distributed continuously with cdf Fi and pdf fi, which have nonnegative
support [0,∞) with Fi(0) ≥ 0. μi, the mean of Oi, is determined by the mean failure rate times the
average repair lead time, consistent with the Palm Theorem result noted above. The distribution of
Bi, denoted by Gi(· | si), is related to Fi(·) through Gi(x | si) = Fi(x + si), which is obtained from
P (Bi ≤ x | si) = P (Oi ≤ x+ si). Furthermore,
E [Bi | si] =
R∞
0 [1−Gi(x | si)] dx =
R∞
0 [1− Fi(x+ si)] dx
3We also note that an important consideration in implementing PBL relationships in practice concerns defining asset
ownership and managerial controls across the three echelons (customer, prime and subsystem supplier). We have observed
that many possibilities are being experimented with in practice.
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so that we obtain
∂E [Bi | si]/ ∂si = −1 + Fi (si) ≤ 0, ∂2E [Bi | si]
±
∂s2i = fi (si) ≥ 0. (1)
Hence we see that expected backorder is decreasing and convex in si.
The performance metric of our problem is availability, which is defined as the fraction of time a
subsystem is operational. Availability is a random variable related to the backorder through Ai =
1 − Bi/N .4 Since the ratio E [Bi | si] /N is typically very small, the expected availability can be
approximated as follows:
E[A0 | s1, s2, ...sn] =
Qn
i=1E[Ai | si] =
Qn
i=1 (1− E [Bi | si]/N) ' 1−
Pn
i=1E [Bi | si]/N.
We see that the relation Ai = 1−Bi/N can be applied to the system (i = 0) as well if we define B0 ≡Pn
i=1Bi, i.e., the overall system backorder is the sum of subsystem backorders. With this definition,
the system availability requirement E[A0 | s1, s2, ...sn] ≥ bA0 (e.g., “expected system availability has to
exceed 95%”) is equivalent to the system backorder constraint E [B0 | s1, s2, ...sn] =
Pn
i=1E [Bi | si] ≤bB0. We call bB0 the system backorder target. The additive separability of B0 in terms of {Bi}i=1,...n
relies on the assumption that the probability of two or more subsystems being backordered at a given
point in time is negligible, thus implying that there is no ambiguity in assigning accountability for
system downtime to a specific supplier and that all system failures are caused by single subsystem
failure. We note that the sufficient condition for this assumption to hold is Cov[Bi, Bj ] = 0, i 6= j. We
also assume that
Pn
i=0 μi >
bB0 in order to rule out the trivial case where s1 = s2 = ... = sn = 0 is
optimal.
We assume that supplier i’s total cost to maintain its subsystem, Ci, has fixed and variable com-
ponents with an additive stochastic term εi, and it can be reduced by supplier’s effort ai so that
Ci = cisi +Ki − ai + εi. Thus, the degree of cost uncertainty is assumed to be beyond the supplier’s
control (e.g., establishing a maintenance network in a different country where the fleet of airplanes is
deployed involves large uncertainties beyond the control of the supplier). We note that the inherent un-
certainty associated with subsystem failure is captured in the inventory demand process and is reflected
in the inventory on-order distribution. Without loss of generality, we normalize the fixed cost to zero,
Ki = 0 for all i. We assume that cost uncertainties εi have zero mean and a finite variance and are
uncorrelated, i.e., Cov[εi, εj ] = 0 for i 6= j. Furthermore, we assume that Cov[εi, Bi] = Cov[εi, Bj ] = 0
4This relationship is based on the ergodic property of the stationary random variable Oi, i.e., the long-run sample
path frequency distribution is identical to the probability distribution. In other words, the fraction of time we observe
Oi to be less than or equal to x has the same probability as Fi(x | si).
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holds for all i, j, i.e., the two sources of randomness, product performance/failure and maintenance
cost variation, are assumed to be independent. By exerting effort ai the supplier incurs monetary
disutility ψi(ai), which is convex increasing (ψ
0
i(ai) > 0, ψ
00
i (ai) > 0), with ψi(0) = 0. In the sequel,
we assume quadratic functional form ψi(ai) = kia
2
i /2 with ki > 0. This assumption does not funda-
mentally change the insights of our model, while generating compact expressions,5 and for this reason
it is commonly used in the literature (see, for example, Chen [5]).
The prime supplier’s objective is to maximize her expected utility function subject to the system
availability requirement, or equivalently the backorder requirement. Her utility is a function of her total
expenditure only, although it is possible to incorporate a fixed revenue term to capture the expected
profit associated with delivering the fleet availability to the end customer. This expenditure is a sum
of transfers to the suppliers, each of which is comprised of (1) a fixed payment, (2) reimbursement
for the supplier’s cost and (3) a backorder-contingent incentive payment. In the performance-based
contracting environment, neither the details of supplier cost nor how he meets performance objectives
is revealed to the prime. Instead, each supplier is compensated for his total realized cost Ci and
his realized backorder Bi. The fact that both contractible variables are random raises the issue of
incentives. Since Ci and Bi are functions of the supplier’s cost reduction effort ai and base stock
level decision si, the supplier can partially control the performance related to his subsystem and his
compensation by setting ai and si. However, stochasticity means he may choose (ai, si) that are not
optimal from the prime’s point of view. For example, an opportunistic supplier may choose to minimize
his own disutility of efforts by “shirking” (i.e., choosing low ai and si), hoping that a fortuitous state
of the world is realized. The prime’s task is then to provide appropriate incentives through contract
terms that would induce the supplier to perform the desired action.
Specifically, the contract that the prime offers to supplier i has the form
Ti(Ci, Bi) = wi + αiCi − viBi, (2)
where wi, αi, and vi are the contract parameters determined by the prime; wi is the fixed payment, αi
is the prime’s share of the supplier’s costs, and vi is the penalty rate for each backorder incurred by
the supplier. With vi = 0 and αi = 0, we obtain a fixed-price (FP) contract whereas with αi = 1 and
vi = 0 we obtain a cost-plus (C+) contract with full reimbursement.
The crucial distinction between the supplier’s actions ai and si is the way each variable contributes
to the performance outcomes; the backorder is influenced by si only, since Bi = (Oi − si)+, whereas
the total cost is affected by both decision variables, Ci = cisi − ai + εi. This interaction creates
5It turns out the condition ψ000i (ai) ≥ 0 is sufficient to ensure solution uniqueness in later analysis.
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asymmetry in how the suppliers’ actions influence outcomes Bi and Ci. Raising ai reduces the total
cost but has no impact on availability, which is driven by component reliability and customer usage
patterns. That said, raising si improves availability but incurs a higher cost. The latter is the classical
cost-availability trade-off seen in the repairable parts inventory theory. We note that an alternative
formulation, whereby supplier effort impacts product reliability and/or repair capabilities (thereby
impacting λi and Li), is not considered here and will be the subject of a follow-up paper.
We assume that all members of the supply chain are risk-averse with expected mean-variance utility
E[Ui(X)] = E[X]− riV ar[X]/ 2. (3)
The constant ri is the risk aversion factor, representing the inherent attitude towards uncertainty. Risk
aversion is common among defense contractors, for example, because of great uncertainties that pervade
product development, production, and maintenance (see Scherer [22] for discussion and references). The
larger the value of ri, the more risk-averse a firm is, whereas risk neutrality is a special case with ri = 0.
This form of utility function is widely used in finance as a basis of mean-variance portfolio theory; see
Markowitz [17]. This form of utility function is exact for the constant absolute risk aversion utility
function (Ui(X) = −e−rX) with a Normally distributed error term (X ∼ Normal(μ,σ2)). For other
distributions and utility functions expression (3) is merely an approximation obtained by expanding
Ui(X) around E[X] in a Taylor series up to the second-order term. This form of utility function
has been widely used in recent operations management literature because of its tractability (Chen
and Federgruen [6], Van Mieghem [26]). In our setting risk aversion constants {ri} are likely to be
quite small for all supply chain members because they are mostly multinational, multibillion-dollar
corporations (see Cummins [10] for evidence that risk aversion is negatively associated with firm size
in defense contracting). Thus, the mean-variance approximation does not cause significant distortions
and provides a “good recommendation” on how to quantify a firm’s risk aversion even if its utility
function is unknown (Van Mieghem [26]).
Our modeling setup and assumptions require some discussion. In trying to come up with a realistic
model of the maintenance relationship, we do not venture beyond a single-period steady-state setup
with moral hazard, since there are enough complexities and richness in our model to merit close
inspection before extending the findings to other settings. Indeed, even the centralized problem in the
absence of agency issues is quite complex, so we use the most basic version of it (i.e., unlimited repair
capacity, stationary failures, etc.), and relaxing any of these assumptions is likely to obscure our findings
regarding contracting issues. A single-period, steady-state assumption is a plausible simplification
of reality, whereas more complex multi-echelon, multi-indenture models are applied in practice to
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determine actual spare part deployments. Due to uncertainties in fleet deployment schedules and
future support budgets, the DoD is unwilling to sign long-term contracts (i.e., for the life of the
program), and instead typically contracts on a shorter-term basis with annual adjustments. Suppliers
typically conduct multi-period budget planning using a single-period steady-state model on a rolling-
horizon basis. Although pre-contractual bargaining or renegotiation may exist in practical situations,
we do not formally model them and assume that the prime offers take-it-or-leave-it contracts to the
suppliers.6 With respect to the moral hazard elements of the model, we assume that neither inventories
of spare subsystem parts nor efforts are observable but that backorders and total costs are observable
and contractible. Observability of backorders is a natural assumption because the system becomes non-
operational during the backorder, as is clearly observable. Furthermore, our assumption with respect
to observability of the total cost implies that sharing of information regarding costs happens on the
aggregate level (i.e., for the program budget) rather than at a detailed level (i.e., for subsystem spare
parts). This assumption is in the spirit of the PBL arrangement (see above) in which the buyer is
not concerned with verifying details about how availability was achieved (e.g., through a combination
of cost-reduction efforts and subsystem spare parts investment), which is typical in related papers
(see, e.g., Bajari and Tadelis [2]). Of course, it is often hard to measure or define product-specific
maintenance costs and some degree of arbitrariness is inevitable in this process. Furthermore, we
assume that there is uncertainty with respect to the total cost for maintaining each subsystem but not
with respect to its unit cost. This is a plausible assumption in the maintenance industry where the unit
cost of spares is easy to estimate based on maintenance and procurement information but where fixed
costs for support (e.g., warehouses, overhead, etc.) are largely uncertain because these costs depend
greatly on where and how systems are deployed, which is usually unknown a priori. In our discussions
with companies involved in such contracts we found that the uncertainty with respect to fixed costs is
of greater importance during the maintenance stage whereas the uncertainty with respect to unit cost
might be more important during the product acquisition stage, which we do not model.
Under the assumptions we have laid out so far, supplier i who is given a contract Ti(Ci, Bi) has the
following expected utility:
E [Ui (Ti(Ci, Bi)−Ci − ψi(ai)) | ai, si] = wi − (1− αi)(cisi − ai)− viE [Bi | si]− kia2i /2 (4)
−ri(1− αi)2V ar[εi]/2− riv2i V ar[Bi | si]/2.
Similarly, the prime’s expected utility E[U0] is
6We note that our model could be used in a “what-if” manner to support analysis of such negotiations.
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E [U0 (−
Pn
i=1 Ti(Ci, Bi)) | {ai, si}] = −
Pn
i=1 (wi + αi(cisi − ai)− viE [Bi | si] (5)
+r0α
2
iV ar[εi]/2 + r0v
2
i V ar[Bi | si]/2
¢
where we have assumed independence across subsystems, i.e., Cov[εi, εj ] = Cov[Bi, Bj ] = Cov[εi, Bi] =
Cov[εi, Bj ] = 0 for i 6= j. Our final assumption is that each supplier has reservation utility (in
expectation) U i which we normalize to zero, U i = 0. The sequence of events (which is standard for
moral hazard problems) is as follows: (1) the prime offers the suppliers take-it-or-leave-it contracts, (2)
the suppliers take cost reduction measures and set the base stock levels of their spares inventory, (3)
costs and backorders are realized, and (4) suppliers are compensated according to the contract terms.
3.2 First-Best Solution: Complete Observability of Suppliers’ Actions
In this section we analyze the problem under the assumption that suppliers’ actions {ai, si} are both
observable and contractible, a situation often referred to as the first-best solution because the prime
avoids incentive problems by dictating {ai, si}. This is the benchmark case against which we can
evaluate the efficiency of other contracts. The prime’s problem is
(AFB) max
{wi,αi,vi,ai,si}
E [U0 (−
Pn
i=1 Ti(Ci, Bi)) | {ai, si}] ,
s.t.
Pn
i=1E [Bi | si] ≤ bB0, (AR)
E [Ui (Ti(Ci, Bi)−Ci − ψi(ai)) | ai, si] ≥ 0. (IRi)
The expected utility expressions are given by (4) and (5). (AR) is the system availability require-
ment constraint expressed in terms of backorders, and (IRi) is the individual rationality constraint
that ensures supplier i’s participation. This program can be solved in two steps. First we determine
the optimal wi for each choice of (ai, si) satisfying (IRi), thus making wi a function of those variables,
wi(ai, si). As is typical in such problems, the prime sets fixed payments {wi} in order to extract all
of the surplus from the suppliers. Then we optimize over all (ai, si) that satisfy (AR). The following
proposition specifies the first-best solution.
Proposition 1 When the suppliers’ decisions are observable and contractible, the optimal contract
specifies the following supplier decisions (ai, si):
ai = 1/ki, (6)
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si(θ) = F
−1
i (max (1− ci/θ, 0)) , (7)Pn
i=1E [Bi | si(θ)] = bB0. (8)
The solution {aFBi }, θFB and {sFBi } =
©
si(θ
FB)
ª
is unique and is obtained by offering a non-
performance-based, risk-sharing contract such that vi = 0 and
αFBi = ri/ (r0 + ri) . (9)
Supplier i’s expected utility is zero, whereas the prime’s expected utility is
Pn
i=0
³
−cisFBi + 12ki −
1
2
r0riV ar[εi]
r0+ri
´
.
We note that {sFBi } and θFB are determined simultaneously from equations (7) and (8). They can
be found using a greedy algorithm similar to the one used in calculating optimal inventory stocking
levels for each part in classical service parts problems (Sherbrooke [24]). The optimal risk-sharing rule
(9) is a modified version of the Borch rule (see Bolton and Dewatripont [3]). It is useful to consider
extreme cases. If ri = 0, i.e., if supplier i is risk-neutral, αi = 0, corresponding to the FP contract;
since the prime is risk-averse whereas the supplier is not, the prime transfers all risks to the supplier.
At the opposite end, consider r0 = 0, i.e., the prime is risk-neutral. In this case αi = 1, meaning that
the C+ contract is used. Although it may sound counterintuitive that the C+ contract achieves the
first-best solution, we should recall that incentives are not an issue in the current setting because the
suppliers’ actions are observable and contractible. The role of the C+ contract is merely to mitigate
the suppliers’ reluctance to participate in the support relationship (the IR constraint), which requires
an extra payment by the prime. When both r0 and ri are positive, the prime and the supplier i share
the cost-related risk according to (9), i.e., based on the value of the supplier’s risk aversion relative to
that of the prime.
We now focus on the prime’s expected utility in which there are three terms for each supplier. The
first term (−cisFBi ) is the cost of sFBi units in the supplier’s inventory. The second term 1/2ki is the
net savings due to the supplier’s cost reduction efforts. The last term 12
r0ri
r0+ri
V ar[εi] can be interpreted
as the joint risk premium between supplier i and the prime, which is positive only if they are both
risk-averse. If r0 > 0 and ri = 0, the prime can protect herself perfectly from the cost-related risk by
offering an FP contract (α = 0), and the supplier, who is risk neutral, absorbs all risks. If, on the
other hand, r0 = 0 and ri > 0, a C+ contract is used to facilitate each supplier’s participation while
the risk-neutral prime absorbs all risks. When both parties are risk-averse, there is a trade-off between
the prime’s desire to protect herself (represented by the term r0α
2
iV ar[εi]/2 in (5)) by decreasing αi
and reducing each supplier’s risk premium (ri(1 − αi)2V ar[εi]/2 in (4)) by increasing αi, resulting in
an inefficiency. The importance of risk allocation among the prime and the suppliers in our model
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is consistent with observations in the related literature that “in recent years, defense contracting has
come to be seen as a problem of optimal risk sharing” (see Cummins [10]).
Unlike cost-related risk, performance risk poses no trade-off between the prime and the suppliers:
it can be taken away by setting vi = 0. In other words, all parties mutually benefit without the perfor-
mance clause in the first-best contract; if vi > 0, a risk-averse supplier demands a premium due to the
possible penalty associated with the stochastic realization of backorders, so a risk-averse prime faces
income fluctuations. Both concerns disappear when vi = 0 without incurring extra cost because the
observability of the suppliers’ actions {si} implies that the actions can be perfectly enforced even with-
out performance incentives. Thus, the prime’s attitudes toward cost and performance uncertainties are
different. This key observation will continue to hold even when the suppliers’ actions are unobservable.
3.3 Private Actions: The Suppliers’ Problem
We now turn to the situation in which suppliers’ actions are unobservable to the prime — which is to be
expected in a PBL environment. Given the contract parameters (wi,αi, vi), supplier i chooses (ai, si)
that maximize his expected utility (4). That is, he solves
max
ai,si
wi − (1− αi)(cisi − ai)− viE [Bi | si]− kia2i /2− ri(1− αi)2V ar[εi]/2− riv2i V ar[Bi | si]/2.
A distinctive feature of this problem is that V ar[Bi | si] is a function of the decision variable si. This is a
departure from the common assumption found of most moral hazard models in economics that only the
mean of the performance measure is affected by the decision variable. In our model the dependence of
V ar[Bi | si] on si is unavoidable. As will become clear, this feature complicates the analysis significantly
and at the same time creates new dynamics. It turns out that the supplier’s problem is generally not
quasiconcave in si, but unimodality can be guaranteed under a mild parametric assumption.
Proposition 2 Suppose αi < 1 and vi[1 − F (0)] ≥ (1 − αi)ci. In this scenario there is a unique
interior solution to the supplier’s problem in which supplier i chooses optimal a∗i and s
∗
i such that
a∗i = (1− αi) /ki, (10)
vi[1− Fi(s∗i )] + riv2i Fi(s∗i )E[Bi | s∗i ] = (1− αi)ci. (11)
Since αi and vi are determined by the prime, the condition in Proposition 2 has to be checked
against the optimal solution. We have verified through numerical examples that the condition is
mild in the sense that it is violated only under extreme parameter settings (e.g., when the prime’s risk
aversion measure r0 is orders of magnitude greater than that of the supplier, ri). We henceforth assume
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that the condition is always satisfied. From the Proposition we obtain the following result, which offers
an intuition into the impact of contract parameters on optimal decisions.
Corollary 1 Suppose conditions in Proposition 2 hold. Then
(i) ∂s∗i /∂ri > 0, ∂a
∗
i /∂ri = 0.
(ii) ∂s∗i /∂αi > 0, ∂a
∗
i /∂αi < 0.
(iii) ∂s∗i /∂vi > 0, ∂a
∗
i /∂vi = 0.
From (i) we see that the more risk-averse the supplier, the greater the optimal inventory position
he chooses. By investing in more spares, the supplier cuts down not only the number of expected
backorders but also the likelihood of backorders (in short, he increases the fill rate), reducing the
variance associated with backorders. Hence, a risk-averse supplier is inclined to increase si to protect
himself from performance uncertainty.7 To put it another way, there exists a preventive measure by
the supplier to avoid the risk of backorders (increase si) but not the cost risk, because the optimal cost
reduction effort is unaffected by the degree of risk aversion, which is apparent from (10).8
Parts (ii) and (iii) in Corollary 1 explain optimal supplier responses to the contract terms αi and vi
which have some intuitive properties. If the prime increases the reimbursement ratio αi, the supplier
becomes less concerned with cost overruns and hence does not exert as much cost reduction effort as
he might otherwise (∂a∗i /∂αi < 0). At the same time, his perceived effective unit cost of inventory
((1−αi)ci on the right-hand side of (11)) decreases, making it desirable to stock more inventory. With
respect to the backorder penalty vi, the larger vi means a stronger incentive to decrease backorders
so that s∗i increases. However, the performance penalty does not affect a
∗
i , as it serves only as an
incentive to reduce backorders, not costs. It is important to note that this predicted behavior is, in
part, a consequence of our model assumptions in which supplier effort affects only cost and that cost
uncertainties and product performance (reliability) risk are unrelated (i.e., independent).
3.4 Private Actions: The Prime’s Problem
Anticipating that the suppliers will respond by choosing {ai, si} according to (10) and (11), the prime
selects contract terms {wi,αi, vi} that achieve minimal total disutility subject to the backorder con-
straint. With the right incentives, each supplier will voluntarily choose (ai, si) that match the prime’s
expectation, even though there is no way to verify the suppliers’ decisions directly. This voluntary
7This result is the opposite of the conclusion in the risk-averse newsvendor model (Chen and Federgruen [6]), which
predicts that the optimal inventory level decreases with the degree of risk aversion.
8This result is due to the assumption that the stochastic term εi enters additively into the supplier’s total cost
Ci = cisi − ai + εi; the effort reduces the mean of Ci but not the variance. Under this standard assumption the supplier
has no control over the variability of cost, so his attitude toward risk does not factor into the decision about a∗i .
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action is expressed in terms of incentive compatibility (IC) constraints, which are added to the prime’s
problem formulation as follows.
(ASB) max
{wi,αi,vi}
E [U0 (−
Pn
i=1 Ti(Ci, Bi)) | {a∗i , s∗i }] ,
s.t.
Pn
i=1E [Bi | s∗i ] ≤ bB0, (AR)
E [Ui (Ti(Ci, Bi)− Ci − ψi(ai)) | a∗i , s∗i ] ≥ 0, (IRi)
(a∗i , s
∗
i ) ∈ argmaxE [Ui (Ti(Ci, Bi)− Ci − ψi(ai)) | ai, si] . (ICi)
Similar to the first-best case, it can be demonstrated that (IRi) constraints bind at the equilibrium
so that we can simplify the problem by solving for a value of wi that leaves suppliers with zero profits.
Using the Lagrange multiplier θ for the backorder constraint, we can write n individual Lagrangian
functions. Moreover, it is convenient to convert the Lagrangian into a function of (αi, si, θ) rather than
a function of (αi, vi, θ) using the monotonicity result ∂s
∗
i /∂vi > 0 from Corollary 1. Using (10), we
obtain
Li(αi, si, θ) = cisi + θE [Bi | si]− (1− αi)/ki + (1− αi)2/ (2ki) +
¡
r0αi
2 + ri(1− αi)2
¢
V ar[εi]/2
+ (r0 + ri) [vi(αi, si)]
2V ar[Bi | si]/2, (12)
whereby
vi(αi, si) =
⎧⎨⎩
(1−αi)ci
1−Fi(si) if ri = 0,
1−Fi(si)
2riFi(si)E[Bi | si]
³
−1 +
q
1 + 4rici(1−αi)Fi(si)E[Bi | si]
[1−Fi(si)]2
´
if ri > 0,
(13)
from (11). We readily notice that the optimal performance incentive vi(αi, si) is a decreasing function
of αi; in order to have the supplier choose si, the prime may decrease vi while increasing αi, or vice
versa. Thus, vi, the incentive to increase the stocking level, and 1− αi, the incentive to reduce costs,
are complements. This observation plays a key role in a later analysis and will be discussed further.
We denote the optimal solution pairs with superscripts SB, {αSBi , sSBi }. Unfortunately, (12) is
not generally quasiconvex and hence is not necessarily unimodal. The analytical specification of sSBi
is intractable even with αi fixed, requiring numerical analysis. To circumvent this difficulty and gain
additional insights, in the next section we focus on several special cases and later analyze the original
problem numerically.
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Contract
type
No performance-based compen-
sation (v = 0)
Performance-based compensa-
tion (v > 0)
Pure per-
formance
(α = w = 0)
The customer is unable to extract all
supplier surplus.
Fixed price
(α = 0)
While achieving the first-best cost
reduction effort aFB, the supplier is
incentivized to reduce s as much as
possible.
First-best can be achieved with the
appropriate choice of w and v under
risk neutrality. Second-best is not
achieved under risk aversion (α > 0
in general).
Cost plus
(α = 1)
The supplier exerts zero cost reduc-
tion effort (a = 0) and is indifferent
toward s.
The supplier exerts zero cost reduc-
tion effort (a = 0) and tries to in-
crease s as much as possible.
Table 1: Incentive effects of various contract combinations in the presence of performance constraint.
3.5 Cost Plus (C+) vs. Fixed Price (FP) vs. Performance Contracts
Before delving into the analysis of optimal contracts, we pause here to evaluate the effectiveness of the
most widely used contract forms, C+ (αi = 1, vi = 0) and FP (αi = vi = 0), and compare them with
the performance contracts (vi > 0). Let us first consider the traditional cost reimbursement contracts,
C+ and FP. Consistent with other literature analyzing and comparing these contracts (see Scherer [22]),
our model indicates that they are polar opposites when it comes to providing cost reduction incentives.
With the FP contract a supplier becomes the residual claimant and hence it is in his interest to reduce
costs as much as possible. In terms of the risk, the FP contract gives perfect insurance to the prime
because the supplier bears all cost-related risks (i.e., cost under- or overruns). In contrast, the C+
contract shifts all risks to the prime, as she has to reimburse whatever the realized cost may be. At
the same time, the C+ contract provides no incentive for the supplier to reduce costs.9
Despite the prevalence of C+ and FP contracts in practice, they do not induce the desired supplier
behavior when a performance constraint has to be taken into account and the prime cannot observe
suppliers’ actions. This becomes clear after inspecting the supplier’s utility function (4). With the FP
contract, it is in the supplier’s interest to reduce not only the effort ai but also the inventory si as much
as possible, thus violating the minimum availability desired by the prime. A C+ contract, on the other
hand, has the effect of making the supplier indifferent to the choice of si. Clearly, inducing proper
actions requires performance incentives. The simplest contract in this category (the “pure performance
contract”) has αi = wi = 0 and vi > 0. Indeed, such a contract can induce the supplier to choose the
optimal inventory level si but the prime is unable to extract profits. Interestingly (to be demonstrated
in the following section) a contract with wi > 0 and vi > 0 can achieve the first-best solution, but only
9For this reason, contracts with 0 ≤ αi < 1 are often called incentive contracts (see Scherer [22]), a term that refers to
incentives to reduce costs rather than performance incentives.
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if all parties are risk-neutral, because proper risk sharing requires αi > 0. Thus, the optimal contract
will have all three components: a fixed payment, a cost-sharing clause, and a performance incentive.
Table 1 summarizes supplier behavior under all of these contract combinations.
4 Analysis
4.1 Risk-Neutral Firms
Many difficulties associated with the analysis disappear if all suppliers and the prime are risk-neutral,
which may be the case in practice if the prime and the suppliers are all very large, well-diversified
corporations. In this case, as we show below, even when actions are unobservable, the first-best solution
is achieved with a contract that is a simple combination of FP and performance-based components.
This solution highlights the performance allocation aspect of our problem at the expense of ignoring
the issue of risk-sharing.
Proposition 3 With r0 = r1 = ... = rn = 0, the first-best solution is achieved if and only if
(i) α1 = α2 = ... = αn = 0,
(ii) wi = cis
FB
i + θ
FBE[Bi | sFBi ]− 1/2ki, and
(iii) v1 = v2 = ... = vn = θ
FB.
The supplier i’s expected utility is zero while the prime’s expected utility is
Pn
i=0
¡
−cisFBi + 1/2ki
¢
.
The preceding result is not entirely new: it is often the case in other principal-agent models that the
first-best solution is achieved with an FP/performance contract between two risk-neutral firms when
there is only one effort variable (for example, see Bolton and Dewatripont [3]). It turns out that having
two effort variables ai and si as well as multiple suppliers leads to the same result. To see why, note
that the prime can (1) choose αi to induce a
∗
i = a
FB
i because the supplier’s response a
∗
i is a function
of αi only and (2) given this αi, choose vi to induce s
∗
i = s
FB
i without incurring any inefficiencies
associated with risk sharing. Thus, αi and vi under risk neutrality serve only as incentives and not as
instruments for providing insurance/sharing risk.
There is, however, a major deviation from the classical analysis involving just one supplier. It
is captured in part (iii), which can be interpreted to mean that every backorder from heterogeneous
subsystems has equal importance regardless of the subsystem unit price ci so performance incentives
are equal across suppliers. In our additively separable backorder model (B0 =
Pn
i=0Bi) this makes
intuitive sense, because the prime does not discriminate between a backorder of a $1,000 item and that
of a $10 item: i.e., each item contributes equally to the downtime of the system. However, it would
be erroneous to conclude that item unit cost {ci} has no effect on determining the backorder incentive
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θFB because it determines θFB indirectly through the (AR) constraint. The fact that penalty rates are
linked across suppliers continues to hold in the risk-averse case, although the equality as in (iii) can no
longer be sustained because of suppliers’ varying attitudes toward risk. The policy implication of this
result is to treat all suppliers equally with respect to the performance incentive.
4.2 Risk-Averse Firms: Cases with Partial Observability
As the next step in gaining insights we now analyze the problem under a simplifying assumption that
either {si} or {ai} are observable and contractible, but not both. As will become evident shortly,
these special cases serve as bounds on the optimal contract parameters under conditions of complete
unobservability and hence are useful in understanding the structure of the problem. We shall first
consider the case when {si} are observable but {ai} are not. This may happen if suppliers utilize
consignment inventory management for all subsystems (which is sometimes the case in practice) so
that inventories are visible to the prime. As si can now be dictated by the prime, there is no need to
the provide the performance incentive vi, i.e., the optimal contract has vi = 0 for all i. The prime’s
problem (A0SB) then becomes
(A0SO) min{αi,si}
Pn
i=1
¡
cisi − (1− αi)/ki + (1− αi)2/ (2ki) +
¡
r0α
2
i + ri(1− αi)2
¢
V ar[εi]/2
¢
,
s.t.
Pn
i=1E [Bi | si] ≤ bB0.
The optimal contract (denoted by the superscript SO) is as follows.
Proposition 4 When {si} of all suppliers are observable to the prime but {ai} are not, it is optimal
to specify the contract terms according to
(i) αSOi = kiri/ (1/V ar[εi] + ki(r0 + ri)) < α
FB
i ,
(ii) wSOi = (1− αSOi )cisFBi − (1− αSOi )2/ (2ki) + ri(1− αSOi )2V ar[εi]/2, and
(iii) vSOi = 0.
sSOi = s
FB
i is imposed on supplier i while the contract terms induce the cost reduction effort a
SO
i =
(1 + kir0V ar[εi]) /
¡
ki + k
2
i (r0 + ri)V ar[εi]
¢
.
Even though one of the supplier’s actions is observable to the prime, we see that the first-best
solution cannot be achieved and hence there are inefficiencies due to incentive issues. Namely, there is
less cost sharing than is first-best optimal because the prime has to give more incentive to reduce costs
than would have been the case after offering αFBi , so the prime transfers more risk to suppliers by cutting
down the cost reimbursement αi. We see that α
SO
i exhibits intuitive properties: as V ar[εi] approaches
infinity, αSOi increases asymptotically to the first-best optimal risk sharing ratio α
FB
i because the
20
supplier’s effort ai is buried in huge uncertainty and there is no need to provide an extra cost reduction
incentive above the level required by the first-best solution. It is also clear that αSOi moves toward
zero (toward an FP contract) as V ar[εi] decreases. The relative risk aversion ratio r0/ri is another
major determinant of αSOi which is similar to the first-best case: if the ratio is small, α
SO
i is on the
C+ side (closer to 1) whereas a large ratio implies that αSOi is on the FP side (closer to 0). In other
words, the more risk-averse a firm is compared to its counterpart (on a relative scale that depends on
the parameter values), the more it is protected from risk.
We note that, quite interestingly, αSOi can be derived from an alternative assumption that (ai, si) are
both unobservable but V ar[εi] À V ar[B i| si]. In this scenario performance uncertainty is negligible
compared to cost uncertainty, so the focus of incentives is on driving down costs, not on improving
performance. The situation is different with regard to {vi}, however, since the prime needs to utilize the
performance penalty rate (vi > 0) in order to have the suppliers choose the desired inventory positions
{si}.
The other possibility is when {ai} of all suppliers are observable but {si} are not. We denote the
optimal solution in this case with the superscript AO. The prime’s problem becomes
(A0AO) min{ai,αi,si}
Pn
i=1
³
cisi − ai + kia2i /2 +
¡
r0α
2
i + ri(1− αi)2
¢
V ar[εi]/2 + (r0 + ri) [vi(αi, si)]
2 V ar[Bi | si]/2
´
s.t.
Pn
i=1E [Bi | si] ≤ bB0
We note that the link between ai and αi is decoupled but that the link between (αi, si) and vi remains.
It is clear that aAOi = a
FB
i as in (6) but that tractable expressions for α
AO
i and s
AO
i do not exist.
Despite this shortcoming, αAOi can be evaluated analytically in the special case with only one supplier,
a scenario which we present next.
4.3 Single Risk-Averse Supplier
In this subsection we assume that there is only one supplier, so we drop the subscript i. Not only
is such a firm-to-firm setting consistent with a majority of supply chain contracting models in the
literature, but it is also one of the commonly observed arrangements found in PBL practice. For
example, a setting in which manufacturing of a single key component is outsourced or one where a
military customer contracts directly with a subsystem supplier fits this description (e.g., the Navy’s
PBL contract with Michelin for tires or commercial airline “power by the hour” contracts with engine
manufacturers like GE and Rolls Royce). In addition, there are instances in which an intermediary acts
as a wholesaler of a subsystem. If the intermediary has a performance contract with the subsystem
provider, he becomes the “prime” in our model. As we will shortly see through numerical experiments,
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insights from this simpler model continue to hold for the general assembly structure with multiple
suppliers.
With a single supplier, it seems natural for the prime to set incentives in a way that E
£
B | sSB
¤
= bB0
holds. In particular, this would be the case if the prime’s disutility was increasing monotonically in
s, which is an intuitive property. Unfortunately, this intuition is not entirely correct. As noted in
the previous section, the analysis of risk-averse firms is complicated by the non-quasiconvexity of the
performance risk premium term (r0 + r) v(α, s)
2V ar[B | s]. For a fixed α, numerical plotting shows that
this term may exhibit quasiconcavity in s (as opposed to the desired quasiconvexity), implying that the
Lagrangian (12) can be bimodal. Thus, the prime may prefer to have more inventory than follows from
E
£
B | sSB
¤
= bB0. This, however, happens only in extreme cases when the prime is several orders of
magnitude more risk-averse than the supplier and therefore wants to protect herself from performance
risk with a very large inventory. In most of our numerical examples with a wide range of parameter
combinations the prime’s objective function was, indeed, increasing monotonically in s. Therefore, we
will henceforth assume that the problem parameters are such that the backorder constraint is binding,
which effectively requires the optimal inventory position sSB to satisfy E
£
B | sSB
¤
= bB0. Given that
v is completely determined by α and s according to (13), the only variable to be determined is the
cost-sharing parameter α so that our problem is simplified to a one-dimensional optimization.
Lemma 1 The prime’s Lagrangian (12) is convex in α when s is fixed.
It follows that there is a unique αSB that minimizes the prime’s disutility. There exists a closed-
form solution, but it is quite complex (the first order condition for α is a cubic equation; see proof
in the Appendix), and inspection alone does not provide ready insights. Instead, we employ implicit
differentiation to gain a better understanding. Namely, we focus on understanding how the parameters
of the contract change when cost uncertainty V ar[ε] changes. There are several motivations behind
this analysis. First, cost uncertainty is of primary importance in practice because it is often harder to
estimate than performance uncertainty. Second, there are significant changes in cost uncertainty over
the product life cycle (while performance uncertainty is relatively more stable) and therefore there is a
need to understand how contractual terms would change in response. Finally, as will be seen shortly,
by varying the cost uncertainty we are able to obtain insights that sometimes differ fundamentally from
insights in the classical literature on moral hazard problems with multitasking.
Proposition 5 Suppose r0, r > 0 and that s
SB is fixed by the backorder constraint E
£
B | sSB
¤
= bB0.
Then αSO < αSB < αAO and vSB > vAO > vSO = 0. Further, let è(r0, r) = ∂L/∂α|α=αFB where L is
the prime’s Lagrangian defined in (12). Function è(r0, r) increases in the ratio r/r0 and crosses zero
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Figure 2: è(r0, r) > 0, the supplier is relatively more risk-averse than the prime.
exactly once. The optimal contract parameters αSB and vSB are related to αFB and vFB as follows.
(i) If è(r0, r) > 0, αSB < αFB, dαSB/d(V ar[ε]) > 0, and dvSB/d(V ar[ε]) < 0.
(ii) If è(r0, r) = 0, αSB = αFB, vSB = vFB, and dαSB/d(V ar[ε]) = dvSB/d(V ar[ε]) = 0.
(iii) If è(r0, r) < 0, αSB > αFB, dαSB/d(V ar[ε]) < 0, and dvSB/d(V ar[ε]) > 0.
First, we note that the optimal cost sharing ratio αSB is bounded above by αAO, the optimal
ratio when the cost reduction effort a is observable. In the current case the effort is not observable and
therefore the prime has to reduce α to provide more incentives to reduce costs. The side effect is that the
supplier’s effective unit cost (1−α)c increases, thus requiring a higher performance incentive v to achieve
the desired inventory position. Therefore, vSB > vAO. Second, we note that αSB is bounded below
by αSO, which we derived by assuming that the inventory position s is observable. When inventory is
not observable, the prime needs to provide a better performance incentive, vSB > vSO = 0, but doing
so exposes both the prime and the supplier to performance risk thus creating inefficiency that can be
mitigated by increasing α. Higher α reduces the effective unit cost (1−α)c for the supplier and allows
him to achieve the inventory position sSB with a smaller v. Hence, increasing α above αSO achieves
the optimal solution.
A comparison of the second-best solution with the first-best solution is more complex. It is instru-
mental to consider two cases based on the relative risk aversion of the prime and the supplier separately.
Since function è(r0, r) increases in the ratio r/r0 and crosses zero exactly once, the condition è(r0, r) > 0
in (i) can be interpreted as r Â r0, where the symbol “Â” means that the supplier is relatively more
risk-averse than the prime. Similarly, è(r0, r) < 0 can be interpreted as r ≺ r0, whereby the prime is
relatively more risk-averse than the supplier. We first consider the former situation (which may arise
if the prime is a bigger and more diversified company than the supplier). We believe that this case
is more natural in practice. Figure 2 illustrates the results in (i). We make the following observa-
tions from these figures. First, αSB < αFB, and the unobservability of effort and inventory results
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in less cost reimbursement than under the first-best solution. Second, αSB increases with V ar[ε] and
asymptotically approaches αFB. With a large cost uncertainty, the risk-averse supplier is reluctant to
participate in the trade, so the prime has to provide insurance by reimbursing a large proportion of the
supplier’s costs. Thus the supplier has less incentive to make efforts to reduce costs. On the other hand,
when V ar[ε] is small, providing cost-reduction incentives becomes more important. Third, the gap
between αSB and αSO decreases in V ar[ε]. This gap can be interpreted as the additional inefficiency
due to performance risk. When cost uncertainty is large, the performance uncertainty V ar[B | sSB] is
negligible and the gap between SB and SO disappears. The gap between αSB and αAO is interpreted
similarly. Finally, vSB decreases with V ar[ε], asymptotically approaching v(αFB, sFB). With higher
cost uncertainty, the performance incentive is lowered.
Overall, we observe that αSB and vSB move in the opposite directions as V ar[ε] increases because
the prime increases α to mitigate the supplier’s risk (we recall that the supplier is more risk-averse
than the prime in the current setting), and as a result, the supplier’s effective unit cost (1 − α)c is
reduced, making it less expensive to stock inventory and allowing for a smaller incentive v. Therefore
increasing 1−α has the same effect on inventory as increasing v; these two incentives are complements
with respect to s. This conclusion is similar to the one presented in Holmström and Milgrom’s [13]
original multitask principal-agent model in which increasing variability in one output leads to weaker
incentives for all outputs. Yet, the mechanism by which we arrive at our conclusion is different.
Specifically, in Holmström and Milgrom [13], raising one effort raises the marginal disutility of raising
another effort, which is not the case in our model (whereby the supplier’s disutilities (1 − α)cs and
ka2/2 are independent of each other). Holmström and Milgrom show that, if an agent has a strong
incentive to perform one task because the result of the other task is difficult to measure (and hence
there is a little incentive to perform it), the agent’s attention is disproportionately directed toward the
former task, since he finds it more costly to exert both efforts. In this case the best course of action for
the prime is to reduce the incentive to perform the former task as well. Another important assumption
in their model is that the outcomes are affected by exactly one effort each, so there is a one-to-one
correspondence between an incentive and an effort. In contrast, our model has an outcome C that is
a function of both a and s via C = cs − a + ε. Increasing the cost reimbursement ratio α because of
large cost uncertainty V ar[ε] produces conflicting reactions by the supplier with respect to a and s,
the former decreasing while the latter increases as described above.
The model closest to ours is found in Bolton and Dewatripont ([3], pp. 223-8) where there is direct
conflict between the tasks, because exerting one effort positively affects one outcome but negatively
affects the other. Despite the similarity in structure, there is no direct correspondence between our
results, because Bolton and Dewatripont compare two tasks performed by one agent and two tasks
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Figure 3: è(r0, r) < 0, the prime is relatively more risk-averse than the supplier.
independently assigned to two agents, a trade-off we do not consider.
Next, we consider the case in which the prime is relatively more risk-averse than the supplier, r ≺ r0
(case (iii) in Proposition 5). Figure 3 is an analog of Figure 2. Compared to the previous discussion,
αSB and vSB exhibit exactly opposite behavior. Now αSB > αFB and αSB decreases in V ar[ε] while
vSB increases in V ar[ε]. This fundamental difference arises because, unlike in the previous case where
insurance was more important for the supplier, it is now the prime who needs protection from risk.
With large cost uncertainty the prime is protected by choosing small α, thereby transferring most of
the risk to the supplier. A nonintuitive consequence of this outcome is that the supplier is incentivized
more to reduce his cost and increase his stocking level when the cost uncertainty is great. Therefore,
the prime’s concern for her own risk protection reverses contractual terms and comparative statics.
The complementarity between 1− αSB and vSB still remains, however: as 1− αSB increases, so does
vSB.We note that results when the prime is more risk-averse than the supplier are somewhat contrary
to what we have come to expect from the existing literature on multitasking where the prime is often
assumed to be risk-neutral.
4.4 Multiple Risk-Averse Suppliers
In this section we present a numerical analysis of the problem with multiple suppliers. We illustrate
our findings via two examples. First, we consider two suppliers that differ by at most one of the
parameters {ri, V ar[εi]}. This example isolates the trade-off between incentives and risk. The second
example is based on actual maintenance data from a fleet of military fighter aircraft. This second data
set illustrates how our model can be applied in practice to support long-term strategic planning and
contract negotiations.
25
4.4.1 Example 1: Two Symmetric Suppliers
In this example we assume that all parameter values are symmetric across the suppliers except for either
{ri} or {V ar[εi]}. Default values are μi = σ2i = 10, ci = 1, ki = 0.2, r1 = 0.1, V ar[ε1] = 10, and bB0 = 4
and a normal distribution of on-order inventory is chosen in keeping with our continuous approximation
for the underlying inventory model. We vary supplier 2’s risk aversion and cost uncertainty r2 and
V ar[ε2] and the prime’s risk aversion r0 in order to observe their effects on (α
SB
i , v
SB
i ) and (a
SB
i , s
SB
i ).
We note that the first-best inventory positions are sFB1 = s
FB
2 = 8.725. Table 4 (see Appendix)
summarizes the results of varying r2 and r0.
We observe only minimal changes in sSB1 and s
SB
2 as parameters change, with the greatest change
occurring when r0 is large ((s
SB
2 − sSB1 )/sFB1 = 0.094 = 9.4% distortion when r0 = r2 = 1, r1 = 0.1).
In contrast, αSB2 changes widely (e.g., with r0 = 0.1, α
SB
2 increases from 0.184 to 0.726 as r2 increases
from 0.01 to 1). We also see that αSB1 is essentially unaffected by r2, the risk aversion of the other
supplier. We infer from these observations that suppliers’ efforts {αi} are more flexible in optimizing
contracts because they are not subject to an externality such as the overall backorder constraint, which
limits the ranges of {sSBi }. We also confirm that αSB2 > αFB2 for a relatively large ratio r0/r2, while
the opposite is true for a small ratio r0/r2, just as predicted by Proposition 5 but for a single supplier.
Furthermore, we notice that αSB2 increases monotonically in r2 for small r0 (= 0.01), but we do not
observe the same monotonicity when r0 is large (= 1): α
SB
2 initially decreases from 0.436 to 0.430 but
then increases to 0.539. The explanation is as follows: when r0 is small, increasing α tends to reduce
both the cost and performance premiums (see (12) and (13)). However, when r0 is large, tension exists
between the two risk premium terms; although increasing α reduces the performance risk for both the
prime and the suppliers, it exposes the prime to the risk of greater cost. These two opposing forces
break down the monotonicity.
Next, Table 5 (see Appendix) illustrates the effect of varying V ar[ε2]. Once again we observe that
sSB2 is not very sensitive to changes in V ar[ε2], but that α
SB
2 is. From the table, we see that α
SB
2 moves
toward αFB2 as V ar[ε2] increases (regardless of the value of r0), confirming the prediction from Proposi-
tion 5 for the single supplier case. In addition, numbers in the table demonstrate that dαSB2 /dr0 > 0 for
small V ar[ε2] whereas dα
SB
2 /dr0 < 0 for large V ar[ε2]. (This can be proven analytically in the single
supplier case, but we omit the derivation.) In other words, when cost uncertainty is relatively low, the
more risk-averse prime moves toward a C+ contract and takes up a larger portion of the cost-related
risk, a nonintuitive result. What actually happens is that the performance premium is more important
in this situation, outweighing the concern for cost-related risks. Clearly, in the presence of performance
risk, the intuition regarding cost sharing is not always straightforward.
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Finally, Table 6 (see Appendix) shows how the optimal contract parameters and the suppliers’
actions vary as the overall backorder constraint changes. In this example, suppliers 1 and 2 are
asymmetric only in their attitude toward risk: r1 = 0.1 and r2 = 1, while r0 = 0.5. As expected,
vSB1 and v
SB
2 decrease as
bB0 increases, since a less stringent backorder constraint allows for smaller
inventories and hence reduces the need for performance incentives. Changes in αSB1 and α
SB
2 are
relatively small. We see that distortion in {sSBi } becomes larger as the constraint is relaxed (measured
by the quantity (sSB2 − sSB1 )/sFB1 , it grows from 2.94% at bB0 = 1 to 9.75% at bB0 = 7). Intuitively, this
happens because the less stringent backorder constraint results in a larger range in which inventories
can be adjusted without violating the constraint. However, the magnitude of the distortion is still
small, confirming our previous observation that the presence of the backorder constraint limits the
prime’s contract parameter choices (α and v) such that they induce the base stock levels to be close to
the first-best values {sFBi }.
4.4.2 Example 2: Actual Data for a Fleet of Military Aircraft
Our second numerical example is based on a real-life maintenance data for a fleet of military fighter
aircraft. A total of N = 156 aircraft are deployed in the fleet. We obtained data on unit costs, daily
failure rates and repair lead times for a representative collection of 50 line replaceable units (LRUs). To
utilize our model we aggregate data into five subsystem groups: avionics (a), engines (e), landing gear
(l), mechanical (m), and weapons (w), based on descriptions of each part. We employ the following
technique to obtain costs, failure rates and lead times for these subsystems. First, we assign each part
to one of the groups, and compute the subsystem’s mean inventory on-order as μi =
Pni
j=1 λjLj , where
i ={a,e,l,m,w} and ni = the number of parts within subsystem i. Thus, we treat each subsystem as a
“kit” which is replaced whenever any part within it fails. Since, in practice, only failed items would be
replaced in response to a subsystem failure, summing the unit costs of the parts to obtain the unit cost of
the subsystem (i.e., ci =
Pni
j=1 λjcj) would undoubtedly overestimate the total capital invested in each
subsystem. Therefore, we introduce a correction by computing the effective unit cost that is weighted
by the demand rate, ci =
³Pni
j=1 λjcj
´
/
Pni
j=1 λj . In other words, we give less weight to the value of
parts that rarely fail and give more weight to the value of parts that frequently fail. Alternatively we
could view the problem where the cost of a failing part kit is equal to the demand-weighted average
cost, i.e., weighted over all parts in the kit.
The first row of Table 2 lists computed values of {ci} using our aggregation technique. To verify that
this approach is reasonable, we compare the amounts of investment in each subsystem
³Pni
j=1 cjsj
´
predicted by our model with two benchmarks. The results are shown in Table 2. The first benchmark,
which we call the “2-echelon, disaggregated” model, has the solution computed using a proprietary
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Subsystem avionics (a) engine (e) landing gear (l) mechanical (m) weapons (w)
ci (in $1,000) 148.6 9.2 27.5 12.1 87.7
ki (×10−3) 0.336 5.435 1.818 4.132 0.570
μi 128.20 19.36 13.72 54.61 66.61
Total investment ($M) with availability target of 95%
2-echelon, disaggregated 21.461 0.381 1.012 1.437 8.305
1-echelon, disaggregated 19.641 0.295 0.772 0.973 7.592
1-echelon, aggregated 18.872 0.258 0.495 0.811 6.139
Table 2: Choices of contract parameters.
commercial algorithm from MCA Solutions, Inc. that optimizes over multiple echelons and indentures
and considers each part-location directly.10 The second benchmark is called the “1-echelon, disaggre-
gated” model; its solution is computed using a classical greedy algorithm, but each LRU is treated as
a separate part. The difference between these two benchmarks is that the former exploits the multi-
echelon nature of the model, whereas the latter does not. Finally, we have the “1-echelon, aggregated”
model, which uses our aggregation technique. We observe that the aggregated model results in an
investment dollar amount that is quite close to those amounts generated by the disaggregated mod-
els, especially in terms of the relative investment distribution among the subsystems. We note that
the aggregated model underestimates the investments required due to the benefit of the risk pooling
associated with treating parts as a kit in one location (the same logic applies when the “1-echelon, dis-
aggregated” model is compared to the “2-echelon, disaggregated” model). This comparison indicates
that our aggregation methodology is quite reasonable for the purpose of predicting how a collection of
first-tier suppliers would allocate inventory investment and assume risk in response to contract terms
proposed by the prime. In particular, our model could be used in the context of a hierarchical solution
whereby the model introduced in this paper would predict how risk would be allocated between the
prime and the suppliers as well as the relative investments that each supplier would make (in total) to
provide the prime with the required system availability, given the terms of a proposed contract. The
actual deployments across multiple parts and locations could then be determined in a second phase
where commercial software such as MCA’s SPO system could be used to optimize the allocation of each
supplier’s total inventory investment subject to their overall subsystem backorder constraint. Various
ownership and control structures could also be accommodated by running the analysis separately for
each structural alternative of the service supply chain. This approach is consistent with our obser-
vations of the current approach that primes, customers, and subsystem suppliers are taking as they
engage in performance-based contract negotiations.
Table 2 summarizes the computed values of {ki}, along with {ci} and the subsystem’s mean in-
10http://www.mcasolutions.com/
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p
V ar[εi]/E[εi] = 0.05
p
V ar[εi]/E[εi] = 0.2
i a e l m w a e l m w
αSBi 0.566 0.087 0.407 0.267 0.462 0.630 0.096 0.846 0.293 0.724
vSBi 65.20 213.61 57.56 134.90 64.04 58.15 209.90 24.31 118.60 41.34
aSBi 1,285 168 326 201 943 1,099 166 84 171 484
sSBi 126.31 27.26 18.29 66.98 69.90 126.20 27.24 18.39 66.95 70.05bAi 96.46% 99.96% 99.88% 99.91% 98.80% 96.42% 99.96% 99.88% 99.91% 98.83%
IIRi 18,769 250 503 810 6,129 18,753 250 505 810 6,143
NCRi 1,007.46 91.31 229.51 117.63 689.88 895.88 91.16 78.13 110.60 417.76
CRPi 271.98 0.21 61.04 1.98 169.81 4,252.59 3.35 225.61 25.72 1,795.11
PRPi 467.17 7.76 17.94 20.96 176.08 375.26 7.58 3.02 16.40 71.33
Table 3: Optimal contract terms and suppliers’ actions. The dollar figures are in thousands. IIR stands for investment in
resources and is equal to cis
SB
i . NCR is −aSBi + 12ki(a
SB
i )
2, the net cost reduction. CRP is the residual cost risk premium,
1
2 (r0(α
SB
i )
2 + ri(1− αSBi )2)V ar[εi], and PRP is the residual performance risk premium, 12 (r0 + ri)(v
SB
i )
2V ar[Bi|sSBi ].
ventory on-order {μi} inferred from the data. To determine values of parameters {ki} and {V ar[εi]},
we use the following approach: for each subsystem, we assume that the fixed cost is 100 times higher
than the (effective) unit cost ci and that the maximum dollar amount of cost reduction a
FB
i = 1/ki
is 20% of the fixed cost. For the sake of simplicity, we also assume that the coefficient of variationp
V ar[εi]/E[εi] is the same across suppliers. We infer the risk aversion coefficient for each subsystem
provider from the market capitalization of a representative manufacturer of such a subsystem. For
example, if Boeing is chosen as the prime and GE as the engine manufacturer, we calculate the risk
aversion ratio of r0/re ' 7 since GE’s market capitalization is roughly 7 times that of Boeing (see
justification for using company size as a proxy for risk aversion in Cummins [10]). This approach is, of
course, quite simplistic, but it fits our aim to illustrate the model (true risk aversion can be estimated
empirically). Using this methodology we choose ra = 1.79r0, re = 0.15r0, rl = 11.76, rm = r0, and
rw = 3.33 and we select r0 = 0.15 while the availability target is set at 95%. The optimal contract
terms and the suppliers’ actions are presented in Table 3.
We consider two scenarios: with small and high cost uncertainty (as captured by the coefficient of
variation
p
V ar[εi]/E[εi]). As can be seen in Table 3, the avionics system drives the results because
it is the most expensive and the subsystem that fails most frequently; due to high unit cost, it is
assigned the lowest availability target (96.46% when the coefficient of variation is 0.05) and it also has
the largest allocation in terms of the inventory investment. In the case with high cost uncertainty, the
cost premium is higher than the performance premium for most suppliers, whereas the performance
premium becomes more salient when cost uncertainty is small. Consistent with our results for a single
supplier, we observe that {αSBi } increases and {vSBi } decreases with
p
V ar[εi]/E[εi]. Finally, we note
that the optimal inventories {sSBi } as well as total investment amounts are very close to the values
computed by the standard greedy algorithm and values of {sSBi } are quite insensitive to changes in
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V ar[εi].
5 Conclusion
The goal of this paper is to introduce contracting considerations into the management of after-sales
service supply chains. We do so by blending the classical problem of managing the inventory of
repairable service parts with a multitask principal-agent model. Furthermore, we use this novel model
to analyze incentives provided by three commonly used contracting arrangements, fixed-price, cost-plus
and performance-based (FP, C+ and PBL). By doing so, we analyze at least two practically important
issues of contracting in service supply chains — performance requirement allocation and risk sharing —
when a single customer (either the prime supplier or the end customer) is contracting with a collection
of first-tier suppliers of the major subsystems used by an end product/system. When performance
is defined as overall system availability, the answer to the former can be found from the solution of
the classic multi-echelon, multi-indenture service part resource allocation problem, à la MCA’s SPO
system. Our innovation is in explicitly modeling decentralized decision making and considering how
firms behave when they face uncertainties arising from both support costs and product performance.
The notion of risk sharing found in the principal-agent literature is incorporated in our model, providing
insights into what types of contract should be used under various operating environments. Specifically,
we have discovered that incentive terms in the contract exhibit complementarity, i.e., incentives for
both cost reduction and high availability move in the same direction as the operating environment
(characterized by cost uncertainty) changes.
Furthermore, our analysis allows us to make normative predictions with respect to how contracts
are likely to evolve over the product life cycle. Given our assumption that supplier effort reduces
maintenance costs but does not improve product performance reliability or repair capabilities, our
model is consistent with the observation that performance uncertainty is relatively stable throughout
the sustainment process, whereas cost uncertainty is likely to be reduced over time by learning about
costs through the deployment of a larger fleet of systems. Thus, if a series of performance contracts
are signed over the product lifetime, our analysis indicates that the cost reimbursement ratio α will
decrease (increase) over time if the supplier is relatively more (less) risk-averse than the prime. For the
performance incentive v the direction is reversed. It would be interesting to verify this result empirically.
From our conversations with executives at a major defense supplier we found that, indeed, typically
contracts evolve over time from being more C+-oriented (large α) to being more FP-oriented (smaller
α). Since larger, more diversified primes are more common in practice, we believe that suppliers are
often more risk-averse in these settings, as independently confirmed by executives we worked with.
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Thus, there is encouraging anecdotal evidence that is consistent with our analysis.
We find that, in the presence of great residual uncertainty associated with performance, cost sharing
is still an effective tool even if the cost uncertainty is small. That is, the combination FP/performance-
based contract is not optimal in such instances (notice the gap between zero and αSB at V ar[ε] = 0
in Figure 2), because the cost reimbursement α can be used as a risk protection mechanism even for
the risk borne by the performance. Adjusting inventory s for this purpose has limited effect because
its primary role is with respect to the availability requirement. Hence, some degree of cost sharing is
recommended in the performance contracting environment even when the cost uncertainty is low. Our
numerical study shows that the optimal inventory position profile {sSBi } is quite insensitive to changes
in risk-related parameters such as r0, ri, and V ar[εi]. This happens because the presence of a stringent
backorder constraint limits the range in which {sSBi } can be varied once parameters {ci} and {μi} are
fixed. Moreover, all analytical results that we obtain for simplified cases continue to hold under more
general conditions.
Performance-based contracting in service supply chains offers fertile ground for research where
economics and classical inventory theory converge naturally. Not only does it pose theoretically chal-
lenging questions but also insights gained from the analysis are of great interest to practitioners who
are currently undergoing major business process changes due to the move towards PBL contracting.
Our paper analyzes several major issues in performance contracting, but many open questions remain.
Follow-up studies may address such topics as the free-riding problem arising from overlapping down-
times across parts; gaming among suppliers and the consequences to realized performance; long-term,
strategic product reliability investment vs. intermediate-term, tactical inventory decisions; investment
in enhanced repair and logistics capabilities that would reduce lead times; alternative ownership and
management scenarios; and many more. We are currently working on some of these issues. Finally,
empirical verification of the insights gained from this paper will lead to more effective implementation
of contract design and aid contract negotiations.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. We first prove that at the equilibrium, all (IRi) constraints are binding,
i.e., wi − (1− αi)(cisi − ai) − viE [Bi | si] − kia2i /2 − ri(1 − αi)2V ar[εi]/2− riv2i V ar[Bi | si]/2 = 0 for
all i. Suppose otherwise, i.e., that there exists j such that wj − (1 − αj)(cjsj − aj) − vjE [Bj | sj ] −
kja
2
j/2− rj(1− αj)2V ar[εj ]/2− rjv2jV ar[Bj | sj ]/2 > 0. By reducing wj by ², the prime’s utility (5) is
increased by ² while the (AR) constraint is unaffected. This result allows us to transform (AFB) into
(A0FB) min{αi,vi,ai,si}
Pn
i=1
¡
cisi − ai + kia2i /2 +
¡
r0α
2
i + ri(1− αi)2
¢
V ar[εi]/2 + (r0 + ri) v
2
i V ar[Bi | si]/2
¢
,
s.t.
Pn
i=1E [Bi | si] ≤ bB0.
Notice that (A0FB) reduces to the classic resource allocation problem faced by a single decision maker
(Muckstadt [18]) in the special case ai = r0 = ri = 0. Clearly, the objective function is minimized
when vi = 0 for all i. With this observation, the Lagrangian with the associated multiplier θ becomes
L(a, s, θ) =
Pn
i=1
¡
cisi − ai + kia2i /2 +
¡
r0α
2
i + ri(1− αi)2
¢
V ar[εi]
¢
/2 + θ
³Pn
i=1E [Bi | si]− bB0´
= −θ bB0 +Pni=1 ¡cisi + θE [Bi | si]− ai + kia2i /2 + ¡r0α2i + ri(1− αi)2¢V ar[εi]/2¢ . (14)
It is apparent that the minimization can be done separately for each supplier. As the objective is
a decreasing function of {si} the optimal values are always at the corner and the (AR) constraint is
binding, implying that θ > 0. Note ∂2Li/∂a2i = ki > 0, ∂2Li/∂s2i = θf(si) > 0, and ∂2Li/∂α2i =
r0 + r ≥ 0. In the absence of cross partial terms ∂2Li/∂aisi = ∂2Li/∂siαi = ∂2Li/∂αiai = 0, so the
Hessian for supplier i is positive definite and hence the problem is convex, establishing the uniqueness
of the equilibrium solution. (6), (7), and (9) are obtained from the first-order condition of supplier
i. Clearly, the optimal si is a function of θ, which is determined from the (AR) constraint, as in (8).
The supplier’s profit and the prime’s expenditures follow immediately.
Proof of Proposition 2. The following identities are needed to prove solution uniqueness:
∂V ar[Bi | si]/∂si = −2Fi(si)E[Bi | si] ≤ 0, (15)
∂2V ar[Bi | si]/∂s2i = −2fi(si)E[Bi | si] + 2Fi(si)[1− Fi(si)]. (16)
Let us drop the subscript i for notational convenience. Differentiating the supplier’s expected utility
function (4) with respect to s, we find that
∂U/∂s = −(1− α)c+ v[1− F (s)] + rv2F (s)E[B | s], (17)
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which is greater than zero for all s if α = 1 and v > 0, because U increases without bound in this case.
If α < 1 and v[1− F (0)] ≥ (1− α)c, then ∂U/∂s ≥ 0 at s = 0, so U is nondecreasing initially. Notice
also that lims→∞ ∂U/∂s = −(1−α)c < 0, so there exists at least one critical point on [0,∞). Setting
∂U/∂s = 0, we obtain E[B | s∗] = (1−α)c− v[1−F (s∗)]/
¡
rv2F (s∗)
¢
. Substituting this result into the
second derivative
∂2U/∂s2 = −vf(s) + rv2f(s)E[B | s]− rv2F (s)[1− F (s)] (18)
(note (15) and (16) are used), we obtain
∂U/∂s|s=s∗ = −vf(s∗)− [v − (1− α)c]f(s∗)/F (s∗) + vf(s∗)− rv2F (s∗)[1− F (s∗)]
= −[v − (1− α)c]f(s∗)/F (s∗)− rv2F (s∗)[1− F (s∗)] < 0,
where the inequality follows from the condition v ≥ v[1−F (0)] ≥ (1−α)c. Since the second derivative
is negative at every critical point, s∗ cannot be a minimizer. Combining this result with ∂U/∂s|s=0 > 0
and lims→∞ ∂U/∂s < 0, we conclude that U has a unique maximizer. Optimal solutions follow from
the first-order conditions.
Proof of Corollary 1. We drop the subscript i for notational convenience. After differentiating the
first-order condition (17) implicitly with respect to r (optimal s is a function of r, i.e., s∗ = s(r)) and
collecting the terms we obtain
∂s∗
∂r
=
v2F (s∗)E[B | s∗]
vf(s∗)− rv2f(s∗)E[B | s∗] + rv2F (s∗)[1− F (s∗)] .
Notice that the denominator has the sign opposite of that in (18). Hence ∂s∗/∂r > 0. Similarly,
∂a∗/∂α = −1/k < 0,
∂s∗
∂α
=
c
vf(s∗)− rv2f(s∗)E[B | s∗] + rv2F (s∗)[1− F (s∗)] > 0,
∂a∗/∂v = 0,
∂s∗
∂v
=
[1− F (s∗)] + 2rvF (s∗)E[B | s∗]
vf(s∗)− rv2f(s∗)E[B | s∗] + rv2F (s∗)[1− F (s∗)] > 0.
Proof of Proposition 3. With r0 = r1 = ... = rn = 0, the prime’s Lagrangian for supplier i becomes
Li(ai, si, θ) = cisi + θE [Bi | si]− ai + kia2i /2
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and solutions are given by (6), (7), and (8). From the supplier’s utility
Ui(ai, si, wi, vi,αi) = wi − (1− αi)(cisi − ai)− viE [Bi | si]− kia2i /2
it is clear that setting αi = 0 and vi = θ yields the same Lagrangian (with the reverse sign) as Li plus a
constant, reproducing the first-best solutions. The supplier’s profit and the prime’s expenditure follow
immediately.
Proof of Lemma 1. Define γ ≡ 4cF (s)E [B | s] /[1− F (s)]2 and note that (13) can be rewritten as
v(α) =
2c
1− F (s)
1
rγ
³
−1 +
p
1 + rγ(1− α)
´
,
from which we obtain
v0(α) = − c
1− F (s)
1p
1 + rγ(1− α)
, v00(α) = −1
2
c
1− F (s)
rγ
[1 + rγ(1− α)]3/2
,
and
∂(v2)
∂α
= 2v(a)v0(a) = − 4c
2
[1− F (s)]2
1
rγ
Ã
1− 1p
1 + rγ(1− α)
!
,
∂2(v2)
∂α2
= 2(v0(a))2 + 2v(a)v00(a) =
2c2
[1− F (s)]2
1
[1 + rγ(1− α)]3/2
.
Differentiating the Lagrangian (12) and substituting ∂(v2)/∂a and ∂2(v2)/∂a2, we find that
∂L
∂α
=
α
k
+ [(r0 + r)α− r]V ar[ε]−
2(r0 + r)c
2
[1− F (s)]2
1
rγ
Ã
1− 1p
1 + rγ(1− α)
!
V ar[B | s],
∂2L
∂α2
=
1
k
+ (r0 + r)V ar[ε] +
(r0 + r)c
2
[1− F (s)]2
1
[1 + rγ(1− α)]3/2
V ar[B | s] > 0.
Proof of Proposition 5. We use the results in the proof of Lemma 1. Define
`FB(α) ≡ [(r0 + r)α− r]V ar[ε],
`SO(α) ≡
α
k
+ [(r0 + r)α− r]V ar[ε],
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`AO(α) ≡ [(r0 + r)α− r]V ar[ε]−
2(r0 + r)c
2
[1− F (s)]2
1
rγ
Ã
1− 1p
1 + rγ(1− α)
!
V ar[B | s],
`SB(α) ≡
∂L
∂α
(α) =
α
k
+ [(r0 + r)α− r]V ar[ε]−
2(r0 + r)c
2
[1− F (s)]2
1
rγ
Ã
1− 1p
1 + rγ(1− α)
!
V ar[B | s].
αFB, αSO, αAO, and αSB are the solutions to `FB(α) = 0, `SO(α) = 0, `AO(α) = 0, and `SB(α) = 0,
respectively. Observe `AO(α) ≤ `SB(α) ≤ `SO(α) for any α. Since `0j(α) > 0 for all j, αSO ≤ αSB ≤
αAO. In contrast, both `FB(α) ≤ `SB(α) and `FB(α) ≥ `SB(α) are possible. To see this, substitute
αFB = r/(r0 + r) in `SB to obtain
`SB(α
FB) =
1
k
r
r0 + r
− 2(r0 + r)c
2
[1− F (s)]2
1
rγ
⎛⎝1− 1q
1 + rγ r0r0+r
⎞⎠V ar[B | s].
Let δ ≡ r/r0 and rewrite `SB(αFB) as a function of δ:
è
SB(δ) ≡ `SB(αFB) =
1
k
δ
1 + δ
− 2c
2
[1− F (s)]2
1
rγ
µ
1 +
1
δ
¶⎛⎝1− 1q
1 + rγ 11+δ
⎞⎠V ar[B | s].
Differentiating, we see that
è0
SB(δ) =
1
k
1
(1 + δ)2
+
2c2
[1− F (s)]2
1
rγ
⎡⎢⎣ 1
δ2
⎛⎝1− 1q
1 + rγ 11+δ
⎞⎠+ (1 + 1/δ)
(1 + δ)2
rγ
2
³
1 + rγ 11+δ
´3/2
⎤⎥⎦V ar[B | s] > 0.
Hence, èSB(δ) is increasing. Notice limδ→0 èSB(δ) = −∞, limδ→∞ èSB(δ) = 1/k. Therefore there is a
unique δ† such that èSB(δ†) = 0. Since èSB(δ) is increasing, èSB(δ) = `SB(αFB) > 0 for all δ > δ†,
implying that αSB < αFB, since `SB(α) is also increasing. Likewise, α
SB > αFB for all δ < δ†.
Differentiating `SB(α
SB) = 0 with respect to V ar[ε] and collecting terms, we see that
dαSB
d(V ar[ε])
=
r − (r0 + r)αSB
1
k + (r0 + r)V ar[ε] +
(r0+r)c2
[1−F (s)]2
1
rγ
1
[1+rγ(1−αSB)]3/2V ar[B | s]
.
The numerator is negative if αSB > αFB, zero if αSB = αFB, and positive if αSB < αFB. The sign of
dvSB/d(V ar[ε]) is the reverse of that of dαSB/d(V ar[ε]) via (13).
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r0 = 0.01 r0 = 0.1 r0 = 1
r2 0.01 0.1 1 0.01 0.1 1 0.01 0.1 1
αFB2 0.500 0.909 0.990 0.091 0.500 0.909 0.010 0.091 0.500
αSB1 0.279 0.279 0.279 0.318 0.318 0.318 0.430 0.430 0.429
αSB2 0.060 0.279 0.755 0.184 0.318 0.726 0.436 0.430 0.539
vSB1 0.994 0.993 0.987 0.952 0.944 0.934 0.823 0.801 0.758
vSB2 1.408 0.993 0.288 1.215 0.944 0.317 0.826 0.801 0.490
aSB1 3.603 3.603 3.603 3.409 3.409 3.409 2.849 2.852 2.856
aSB2 4.699 3.603 1.224 4.082 3.409 1.371 2.820 2.852 2.303
sSB1 8.729 8.725 8.678 8.779 8.725 8.650 8.905 8.725 8.330
sSB2 8.722 8.725 8.773 8.672 8.725 8.802 8.559 8.725 9.151
−U0 13.342 13.923 15.153 14.000 14.435 15.676 19.104 19.153 20.141
Table 4: Effects of changing r2. Italics indicate symmetric parameters.
r0 = 0.01 r0 = 0.1 r0 = 1
(αFB2 = 0.909) (α
FB
2 = 0.5) (α
FB
2 = 0.091)
V ar[ε2] 1 10 100 1 10 100 1 10 100
αSB1 0.279 0.279 0.279 0.318 0.318 0.318 0.429 0.430 0.430
αSB2 0.172 0.279 0.650 0.268 0.318 0.442 0.654 0.430 0.156
vSB1 0.993 0.993 0.992 0.944 0.944 0.944 0.794 0.801 0.800
vSB2 1.127 0.993 0.507 1.007 0.944 0.785 0.505 0.801 1.149
aSB1 3.603 3.603 3.603 3.409 3.409 3.409 2.853 2.852 2.852
aSB2 4.138 3.603 1.752 3.658 3.409 2.790 1.731 2.852 4.221
sSB1 8.724 8.725 8.718 8.725 8.725 8.723 8.670 8.725 8.715
sSB2 8.727 8.725 8.733 8.726 8.725 8.728 8.782 8.725 8.735
−U0 13.653 13.923 15.139 14.172 14.435 16.780 17.794 19.153 24.341
Table 5: Effects of changing V ar[ε2] when r1 = r2 = 0.1. Italics indicate symmetric parameters.
bB0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
αSB1 0.421 0.404 0.398 0.396 0.396 0.397 0.399
αSB2 0.592 0.604 0.614 0.624 0.634 0.644 0.653
vSB1 1.678 1.147 0.935 0.820 0.748 0.699 0.666
vSB2 0.792 0.557 0.463 0.412 0.379 0.357 0.341
aSB1 2.896 2.980 3.011 3.021 3.021 3.015 3.006
aSB2 2.039 1.981 1.929 1.879 1.830 1.782 1.737
sSB1 11.852 10.384 9.355 8.511 7.765 7.078 6.425
sSB2 12.205 10.752 9.751 8.948 8.259 7.644 7.083
(sSB2 − sSB1 )/sFB1 2.94% 3.48% 4.15% 5.00% 6.17% 7.69% 9.75%
IIR1 11.852 10.384 9.355 8.511 7.765 7.078 6.425
IIR2 12.205 10.752 9.751 8.948 8.259 7.644 7.083
NCR1 2.057 2.092 2.104 2.108 2.108 2.106 2.102
NCR2 1.623 1.589 1.557 1.526 1.495 1.465 1.435
CRP1 0.610 0.586 0.577 0.574 0.574 0.576 0.578
CRP2 1.708 1.696 1.687 1.680 1.675 1.671 1.668
PRP1 1.252 1.160 1.116 1.090 1.074 1.062 1.055
PRP2 0.574 0.587 0.600 0.611 0.621 0.628 0.632
−U0 24.521 21.484 19.425 17.781 16.364 15.088 13.905
Table 6: Effects of changing B̂0, with r0 = 0.5, r1 = 0.1 and r2 = 1. IIR stands for investment in resources and is equal
to cis
SB
i . NCR is −aSBi + 12ki(a
SB
i )
2, the net cost reduction. CRP is the residual cost risk premium, 12 (r0(α
SB
i )
2+ ri(1−
αSBi )
2)V ar[εi], and PRP is the residual performance risk premium,
1
2
(r0 + ri)(v
SB
i )
2V ar[Bi|sSBi ].
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